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Abstract
This article explores the complex relationships among two
different types of critique, the socio-temporal zone known as
"everyday life" and the moment of the encounter by those who
are encountering art works. It proceeds with a close study of
the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Mikel
Dufrenne, and tests their key concepts against generalized
contemporary art practices that question a model of the
traditional aesthetic experience by suggesting the possibility
that within the expanse of postmodernity such a paradigm has
shifted, (although it is not completely irretrievable). The
paper argues that this shift has been achieved by remobilizing
readymade objects and banal customs within spaces otherwise
reserved for extraordinary experience. Thus, it also considers
the problem of authoritative experience and Jürgen Habermas'
extension of the Husserlian Lebenswelt in order to map out the
urgencies of our current cultural sphere.
Key Words
authentic experience, contemporary art, criticality, everyday
aesthetics, phenomenology
1. Introduction
The inferno of the living is not something that will be; if
there is one; it is what is already here, the inferno
where we live every day, that we form by being
together. There are two ways to escape suffering it.
The first is easy for many: accept the inferno and
become such a part of it that you can no longer see it.
The second is risky and demands constant vigilance and
apprehension: seek and learn to recognize who and
what, in the midst of the inferno, are not inferno, then
make them endure, give them space.[1]
Italo Calvino's concept of the "inferno," related here by Marco
Polo to Kublai Khan, stems from his imagining the crisis of
modernity as a sort of Pandora's Box. The times in which we
now live, when the inferno flourishes, suggest that if we are to
expand our horizons, "heal the world," learn from one another,
and begin to redefine notions of progress, we must choose to
begin such work from a middle ground, a point without origins,
that is, what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari have repeatedly
referred to as a rhizomatic state of constant "becomings." In
many ways this standpoint has resulted from the general
consensus that refuses to validate an antiquated, Eurocentric,
patriarchal, heterosexual, and modernist cogito. For decades,
the postmodern call for a turning away from models of truth,
while controversially grounded in its own idiosyncratic
theoretical parameters, has instead insisted on a model of the
"no" (and, on occasion, the "maybe"), causing contemporary
optimists to search high and low for an alternative pathway to
the "yes."

I situate myself here as one of those figures confronted every
day with a cultural mainstream that I have been taught to
question. Therefore, it is not surprising that I have looked to
contemporary visual art as the conduit capable of
rearticulating experience as potentially communicable in its
inherent ambiguity; that is, at this site platforms are
encouraged upon which difference is immediately affirmed.
Problems are presented as the solution and dissonance
overcomes regimented agreement; both are too often
disguised as "democracy" devoid of conflict. Contemporary
visual art that reveals the (in)constancy of the banal, often by
poeticizing the readymade object or the phatic exchange,
presents an escape route from the rule of contradiction and
the pedagogical paradigm.
2. Criticality
In general, one might think of experience as a set of
sensibilities and possibilities that produce a conscious subject.
Culminating at Documenta XI in 2002 in the wake of
globalization and identity politics, experience seemed to be
reserved for the oppressed or marginalized, proposing a
responsibility among those without such experience to
recognize and validate it. More recently, at the tenth Lyon
Biennial in 2009 entitled The Spectacle of the Everyday,
attention shifted towards the more simple and yet profound
aspects of humanity, towards those common threads
connecting each subjectivity to the world at large, in a word,
to the quotidian. The question is, how might one go about
recontextualizing notions of experience in our current cultural
climate in order to present ourselves to one another and bring
about new avenues of dialogue in ways that affirm difference
and reject homogeneity?
After criticism or the practice of comparing and contrasting,
and after structuralist and post-structuralist critique or the
practice of analytical assumptions, is there space for what
theorist Irit Rogoff termed 'criticality,' for that which uses the
language of critique from an uncertain position where we
inhabit the conditions we are analyzing? Criticality might be
that missing register that combines the analytical with the
experiential.[2] If the space of criticality insists that there is
no outside quarter from which to knowingly look in and pass
judgment, then the space of everyday activities, routines, and
recognitions might act as a viable lens through which we may
consider such a position and filter our differences as well as
our common traits. The implication that this space of criticality
can be realized and facilitated by the artist after his or her
conscious evacuation from the role of proprietor.
3. Reciprocity
In her essay, "The Experience of Art as a Living Through of
Language," Kate Love wrestled with Giorgio Agamben's claim
that experience has been destroyed in the modern world.
Through her own performative transcription of a conversation
between a student and a lecturer, and the description of an
encounter with a photograph by Gabriel Orozco, she arrived at
the notion of an "activated space" or "that precise moment
when consciousness meets language meets world ...."[3] Love
insisted that a sense of reciprocity can be shared between the
viewer and the creator of an art work in terms of experience.

This sense reveals itself during the encounter with that art
work when it acts as a fulcrum between two interpretations of
the same event, the two facets of its composition and its
reception as connected by experience. After visualizing herself
completing Orozco's actions of setting up the scene in his
photograph, she wrote, "This supposed anticipation of
another's experience ... felt as if it was entirely interwoven
with that of mine - appearing to break and double back upon
my 'own' experience - rupturing any notional autonomy or
self-same identity that I previously supposed."[4]
The binary relationship suggested here, though shaky in the
wake of post-structuralist reasoning, began to formulate a
position from which to rethink the practice of incorporating
everyday objects into art work to more of the praxis of doing
so; that is, if being able to visualize another's experience and
then intermingle it with one's own experience requires the
trigger of the art work, it stands to reason that the trigger
itself might vary in degrees of intimacy. Those objects that
have more familiarity might hasten the responsiveness Love
described as the "constitution of subjectivity" and bring about
the continual recognition of the humane through the defamiliarized utilitarian, as opposed to the traditional and
limited concept of the readymade cited throughout the history
of art ad nauseam (for example, the Duchampian question of
what is allowed to constitute a work of art). Under these
circumstances, the worn out modes of interpretation or
searches for meaning within works of art could be replaced by
more reflexive, if not cooperative, points of entry. Love
continues:
[I]t might be possible to begin to analyze the world
through and against the concepts of experience that the
work of art, itself, tends to produce. That is, to redefine
the notion of art as a mode of analysis whereby
knowledges and ideas could be extracted from the
process of making art, thereby enabling both the maker
and the viewer to tune in to the sorts of thinking or
approaches to the world that the apprehension of art
itself makes you do.[5]
This hypothesis stemmed from a resolution to confront
Agamben's contention that experience in the modern era has
been polluted by a shift in values and an imbalance between
subjective events and the ability to clearly communicate them
to others. Indeed, this observation coincided with Jean
Baudrillard's portrait of our age as one of stagnant nullification
and useless appropriation.[6] The leveling of all aspects of
(post)modern living, the sameness of it all, along with the
silencing of the authoritative subject, such as the death of the
author, detracts from any possibility of remarkable causes and
effects -- or does it? Love concluded that the point of light
that appears at the end of the tunnel could be the
contemporary work of art, and that it was there that the
existence of language itself became apparent and acted as a
catalyst for rearticulating lived experience as "unbound and
vibrant."[7]
If one is removed from the banality of everyday contexts
through an encounter with a work of art, then a type of "living
through" what is otherwise overlooked or ignored might

happen. The art work creates a forum in which differing
experiences can be thought or even acted due to fresh
perspectives and exposures, since the artist appropriates and
subtly manipulates the common object in order to imply such
appropriation. Therefore a clarification of the problem of
being-in-the-world is just as available to the viewer of the
work; the same praxis becomes accessible whether it is
through the making or the viewing of the work.
4. Lifeworld
Let us now shift the focus towards an idea of communicating
such experiences constructively in the aftermath of
deconstruction. The work of Jürgen Habermas, rightly
considered to be an extension of the modernist agenda, is able
to inform and arm a counter-project of affirmative uncertainty,
or "criticality," through its teleological insistence on social
constants. Even if society can never be self-correcting, as
postmodernists such as Jean-François Lyotard have claimed,
then at least an understanding of that impulse can be
recognized and confirmed in Habermas' scientific approach and
in art works that hone in on the quotidian as a stage and
protagonist for social betterment. Such attempts begin to hint
at the extent to which we are still within modernity, however
misguided we may be, in that these efforts rely, perhaps
unknowingly, on the negative, that is, on the admission of
difference in order to suggest rather than to determine or
represent potentiality.
In The Theory of Communicative Action, Habermas addressed
the notion that meaning can be achieved from the everyday by
developing Edmund Husserl's foundational concept of a
"lifeworld," or Lebenswelt, which asserts that lived experience
exists a priori to any reflection or analysis that might be
imposed on it.[8] Habermas added weight to this claim by
suggesting that such a world or system can be thought of "as
represented by a culturally transmitted and linguistically
organized stock of interpretive patterns."[9] As his concern
lay with social behavior, he focused on language or speech
acts in order to show how patterns are always already in place
to guide and determine modes of experience on a daily basis.
He designated three categories of address that situate the
speaker in relation to the world. The first mode of address
pertains to the world as objective, or from a position of
certainty based on common knowledge; the second to the
world as social, or from a position of interactivity based on
custom; and the third to the world as subjective, or that
stance that most closely resonates with what has been
described as authoritative experience. Speakers and hearers,
the participants of everyday life, are consistently and
simultaneously negotiating all three of these positions in order
to interact with one another.
For Habermas, the governing system that he referred to as
the "normative framework" is all-encompassing and
establishes the context of an event or "action situation," and
therefore the acceptable or habitual behavioral responses in its
witnesses. As we move through our daily tasks, our focus is
continually in flux, and it is the event or situation that centers
our attention and becomes the spatio-temporal zone where
the lifeworld surfaces.[10] Yet this activation also conceals

the lifeworld; its refusal, in fact, affirms it: "From a
perspective turned toward the situation, the lifeworld appears
as a reservoir of taken-for-granteds, of unshaken convictions
that participants in communication draw upon in cooperative
processes of interpretation."[11] All interactivity relies on the
lifeworld for its regulation as a sort of script from which the
situation can unfold, but this is not a knowing reliance. That is
to say, individuals cannot actively communicate within the
patterns they inescapably enact and enforce.
Participants find the relations between the objective,
social and subjective worlds already pre-interpreted.
When they go beyond the horizon of a given situation,
they cannot step into a void; they find themselves right
away in another, now actualized, yet pre-interpreted
domain of what is culturally taken for granted. In
everyday communicative practice there are no
completely unfamiliar situations. Every new situation
appears in a lifeworld composed of a cultural stock of
knowledge that is "always already" familiar.[12]
The challenge, then, is to think beyond these prescribed
restrictions in order to locate a space of optimistic uncertainty
in everyday life that enables a socio-political transformation
that was previously caught up in a utopian meta-narrative.
The artistic encounter presents itself as a viable starting point
for such a consideration; a catalyst is needed to galvanize a
space where criticality can operate in conjunction with
Habermas' observations by pushing past their limits and
affirming difference. Therefore, if such an encounter is our
launch pad, then a phenomenological investigation can qualify
and prepare it for extended sociological readings.
5. Merleau-Ponty
In The Phenomenology of Perception, Maurice Merleau-Ponty
outlined and engaged with the study of the subject and his or
her relationship with the physical world. Criticizing René
Descartes for limiting his scope to the mantra cogito ergo
sum, or the idea that the mind projects and thereby posits the
world as it is recognizable by its thinker, Merleau-Ponty
expanded upon the earlier work of Husserl and suggested that
the world and the subject are interdependent and therefore
mutable. The world cannot be considered to be an object
separate from us in it, and hence is not one of independent
physical objects or disconnected subjectivities but rather a
phenomenological or inter-subjective world. Within the world,
perception is always physical, and experience is achieved only
by encounter, not by what he takes to be the impossibility of
completely isolated postulation. That is to say, "[t]he body is
our general medium for having a world."[13]
Encounters with art works inevitably involve the viewer's
physicality and previous experiences, which are inseparable
from any capacity to analyze. Therefore, phenomenology and
its relationship to aesthetic experience should also be
addressed in order to establish a foundation from which to
reconsider the experience of art within everyday life. Love's
essay established that the viewer brings something of his or
her own life history to the table, as it were, when facing a
work of art with recognizable components. Several individuals
before an art work will each enter their encounter with it

subjectively, but then perhaps comprehend a common bond
rendered accessible by the work itself; the personal opens the
door to the public. According to Merleau-Ponty:
[T]he phenomenological world is not pure being, but the
sense which is revealed where the paths of my various
experiences intersect, and also where my own and other
people's intersect and engage each other like gears. It
is thus inseparable from subjectivity and intersubjectivity, which find their unity when I either take up
my past experiences in those of the present, or other
people's in my own.[14]
If we take "pure being" to mean that meditative state in which
"I think, therefore I am," then it cannot be party to any notion
of lived experience since, phenomenologically, to perceive
means to act, to intuitively connect one's own being with the
being that is the world; thought alone yields nothing but
hindered speculation. The knowledge that others, in addition
to the subject, are simultaneously acting-perceiving occurs
when the viewer recognizes the experience of the artist within
the art work, and also when the experiences of other viewers
are brought to light in the presence of that art work. This
environment can be seen as a revealing microcosm of what
otherwise involves the broader, general realm of lived
experience that occurs on a daily basis. The art work acts as
an aid by which one can begin to recognize that the isolationist
and existentialist notion of totally segregated subjectivities is
misconstrued.
It is interesting to note that the characteristics of the work
itself might also contribute to the ease by which such
realizations might occur. For instance, it could be maintained
that Daniel Spoerri's tableaux-pièges ("snare pictures")
facilitate accessibility to concepts of inter-subjectivity more
readily than Jackson Pollock's overbearingly authorial drip
paintings. I do not mean to suggest that any art work that
has not made use of readymade materials completely
obfuscates the experience of the viewer before it, only that
such materials serve to enhance the possibility for a
recognizable field of common experience between artist and
viewer in the moment of the encounter. These works by
Spoerri aim at the literal capturing of everyday experiences,
and are achieved by permanently attaching every item left on
a surface to that surface, thereby fixing those moments of
exchange in time. By this arresting gesture, the artist is able
to inject an art work with a past temporality and a social
interactivity that would otherwise go unnoticed in the moment
of its happening and be unremembered after the fact. In his
own words, the objects
… contaminate one another and tell us about a moment
of one particular personal history. It's exactly the same
history as a city's, only it's shorter and perhaps less
complicated …. I lent everything an equal optical value:
cigarette butt, piece of bread, plate, cheese rind. After
that, what was important was putting it up on the
wall.[15]
In addition to provoking a close observation of the act of
sharing a meal and what that might indicate for a broader
sociological interpretation, these art works also question the

field of abstract expressionist painting that came to
prominence in the late 1940s. The apparent need to arrive at
an alternative potentiality for the picture plane challenged
Spoerri to include the seemingly banal in his work so as to
attach the world, quite literally, to the canvas on the wall and,
in so doing, reconcile the distances between the artist, the art
work, and the viewer.
Merleau-Ponty insisted that "[w]e must re-examine the
dilemma of for itself and in itself, which involved putting
'significances' back into the world of objects and freeing
subjectivity, as absolute non-being, of any kind of inherence in
the body. This is what we are doing when we define sensation
as co-existence or communion."[16] The idea that a work of
art might be conceived as autonomous, with meaning
ingrained, is quite audacious in this sense. Meaning, for lack
of a better word, stems from the limitless perspectives of
active viewers; the "eye … is a certain power of making
contact with things, and not a screen on which they are
projected."[17] Vision, in a way, is predatory and latches onto
the object within its field, but there is no way to visualize the
world in its entirety, only facets of it, indicating that because
visual experiences are many and varied between subjects,
there is no way to conceptualize a fully intact or non-yielding
world. In this way, meaning cannot be pinned down; whatever
meaning one finds only suggests there are others to be found.
However, Merleau-Ponty is careful to insert the point that the
object is not entirely inactive:
But we have learned in individual perception not to
conceive our perspective views as independent of each
other; we know that they slip into each other and are
brought together finally in the thing. In the same way
we must learn to find the communication between one
consciousness and another in one and the same world.
In reality, the other is not shut up inside my perspective
of the world, because this perspective itself has no
definite limits, because it slips spontaneously into the
other's, and because both are brought together in the
one single world in which we all participate as
anonymous subjects of perception.[18]
Though we might acknowledge the existence of others in the
world, it is difficult to imagine their own individual
subjectivities without forcibly relinquishing our own; one
cannot ever fully fathom what it means to physically see from
someone else's perspective. Objects, whether art works or
not, act as links between ourselves and others, and stimulate
the understanding that the world is shared and perceived
infinitely. Observing things being taken up and put to use in
the world by others reveals that any notion of an entirely
subjective, private, or unique experience is misguided.
Experiences cannot be tallied up and collected but are always
in flux, since witnessing the experiences of others with things
modifies one's own understanding of them in relation to the
self. In this sense, affirming differences may relate to the
expansion of the limits of the real in terms of subjective
perception. That is, by seeing objects encountered by others,
"... they are no longer simply what [one] could make of them,
they are what this other pattern of behavior is about to make
of them."[19] The conclusion Merleau-Ponty arrived at is not

unlike the goal Spoerri set for himself as an artist, namely that
by baptizing everyday objects and incorporating them into
works of art, they extend the horizon of everyday experience
and eventually allow for a potentiality of an everyday
aesthetics to be appreciated outside the realm of art, a
challenging and crucial problematic explored by Yuriko Saito in
her own recent work.[20]
Since the concept of criticality infers that there is no external
position from which to analyze an event but only the
simultaneity of its experience and thinking through it, it is
useful to note that Merleau-Ponty emphasized the need to reexamine the social world by declaring:
It is as false to place ourselves in society as an object
among other objects, as it is to place society within
ourselves as an object of thought, and in both cases the
mistake lies in treating the social as an object. We must
return to the social with which we are in contact by the
mere fact of existing, and which we carry about
inseparably with us before any objectification.[21]
Here is a call to ignore no longer the very real presence of the
other in favor of an antiquated notion of the self as one that is
in complete control of one's surroundings and the perception
of them. We are always involved and, in terms of the above,
operating within reach of criticality. That is, participation
cannot be chosen but is always already happening. This is
why the goings on of everyday life must be illuminated. It is
without question that art works, or the experience of them,
facilitate this essentially simple realization.
6. Dufrenne
In the historical context of phenomenology beginning with
Husserl, Mikel Dufrenne followed Merleau-Ponty in relying on
the physicality of the subject to predicate any concept of
perception. His focus in The Phenomenology of Aesthetic
Experience was on the viewer's encounter with the aesthetic
object or art work in the light of earlier theories on the idea of
the lived body, but also in relation to the antiquated and elitist
notion that aesthetic experience should be heightened,
elevated, or removed from the banality of the everyday.
Therefore, Dufrenne's work is an essential resource.
Echoing Marcel Duchamp, Dufrenne asserted that a work of
art is nothing without the spectator's presence since "the work
has value only as long as it has being, and the primary task of
the public is to fulfill this being. What the work expects of the
public is, first of all, its completion."[22] This effectively
established the reciprocal relationship between artist and
viewer. At this early stage in his text, however, he reasoned
that the differences between aesthetic objects and generic
objects should be considered, since every object requires the
recognition of a perceiving subject. It is the common
experience of those everyday objects that enables us to
comprehend their various uses; we can be taught their
meanings. Conversely, the aesthetic object must be
experienced first-hand: "[T]he reality of this object can only
be revealed, not demonstrated. It has no other guarantee than
to be attested to by a perception and to be situated at the
crossroads of a plurality of perceptions."[23]

It is important to note that, like many theorists in the
immediate post-war era, the examples of aesthetic objects
Dufrenne had in mind were, for the most part, conservative.
Yet this is useful rather than antithetical because it becomes
easier to postulate that, by the 1960s, experimentation in the
visual arts directly confronted such assumptions regarding the
experience of art work. If it is viable that an encounter with an
aesthetic object is distinct from an encounter with any other
object, then what might be the effect of that aesthetic object
incorporating objects that are not? For many postmodern
artists, in order to conceive the world one must make use of
the characteristics already of the world. Any concept of the
imaginary must develop from being grounded in reality, in real
shapes and compositions; that which we imagine is an
amalgam of those things that we have seen. Following this
logic, Dufrenne's postulation that the dichotomous relationship
between the ordinary and the aesthetic object might be
reopened in order to allow for the possibility that the
aestheticization of those ordinary objects encourages a less
rigid concept of the perceiving subject during the aesthetic
experience. As Dufrenne was concerned with the witnessing of
the art work, he took steps to resolve exactly what occurs
when one takes on that role.
It seems, and especially in the plastic arts, that the
witness is first of all a registering apparatus placed at
one point or another in space by the work as it
organizes its own way of being viewed. A painting is
created to be seen at a certain distance and from a
certain viewing point. It organizes itself under our
gaze.[24]
Here is a description of what Michel Foucault later referred to
as an aspect of the "classical episteme;"[25] the elements of
the picture communicate their own representational qualities in
conjunction with the viewer's organized and momentarily
directed gaze. Dufrenne insisted that, at the stage of aesthetic
experience, the viewer is stunned into awed submission by the
art work.
Our presence to the aesthetic object has something
absolute about it - not at all the absolute of a
transcendental cogito, which would be out of play, but
the absolute of a consciousness which is entirely open
and as if possessed by what it projects. In short, the
witness is not a pure spectator but an involved one involved in the work itself.[26]
Though involved, viewers are so enveloped that reality is
figuratively suspended. "[I]t is in the work that they find
meaning, not in themselves as something to transfer onto the
work....But we must add at once that it is the work which
awakens us to ourselves."[27]
If the art work is in control of both artist and viewer in the
sense that it forcefully demands to be created and then
agreeably asks to be understood, then the aesthetic
experience is discovered rather than dictated, even if such an
experience, by requiring a witness, teaches us more about
that witness's own subjectivity than another type of
experience might do. Within such a framework, the art work

becomes what Rebecca Schneider calls a "witness machine." In
her own words (and perhaps more tactfully than Dufrenne),
she suggests, "Such objects … stand as witness to the event
as seen and make the museum viewer witness to the event as
missed. In such a scene, a viewer becomes, like the object, a
witness."[28]
Remembering what Kate Love concluded regarding the notion
of a reciprocal relationship between artist and viewer
locatable at the encounter with the art work, and taking into
account Dufrenne's conditional and revelatory model, one may
infer from their comparison with Schneider's theory that all
three support the concept that the fluctuation of subjectivities
before the stalwart work of art denies a fixed mode for its
analysis. In support of the concept of criticality, attention
shifts from the need to establish meaning in and of the work
itself, such as a superfluous focus on the circumstances of its
genesis, to the possibility that the unique responses from each
witness may be compared and contrasted. In essence, the
visual art work is positioned as an event to be continuously
revisited, and it is this variable space-time that enables the
formulation of a concept for an engaged and experiencing
public.
In order to better understand the idea of such a public, it is
helpful to return to Dufrenne's treatment of it, one that is
careful to differentiate between definitions of "public" and
"audience." If the work of art presents itself in such a way as
to formulate an otherwise unlikely model of a collective, then
"[t]he important thing ... is to see how this public tends to
embody the universality which is already found in the solitary
witness."[29] What has been called the "witness machine"
generates potential multiplicities of the subject, rendering
personal identities less distinct. In addition, Dufrenne insisted
that equilibrium is desired by the viewer, since an inherent
aspect of the experience of a work of art is that it be shared:
The aesthetic emotion wants to communicate and
spread. It seeks confidants and co-witnesses. And it
seeks guarantors as well. The demand for a public
corresponds to a craving for security. The judgment of
taste which ratifies and concludes the aesthetic
experience feels sure of itself only insofar as it has
supporters. For the judgment of taste, the homage of a
public or of a tradition is the best assurance.[30]
The encounter with a visual art work differs from one with
others. Dufrenne's viewing subject is nurtured by the shared
reaction of others and is related to Merleau-Ponty's example
of the reading subject submitting to a broader expressive
source and relinquishing the thinking ego. Even if no one else
is present, the knowledge that another will react to the work
influences the experiencing of it; visual art promotes an idea
of a receiving public and opens a space of, and time for, what
can be understood as a position of criticality. That is, "the
aesthetic object gains being from the plurality of
interpretations which attach themselves to it."[31] The visual
art work is not necessarily fixed, but infinitely embellished and
expanded in meaning and modes of reception by a revolving
set of subjectivities; it is elusively anti-compositional. The key
question is, "[H]ow does it create its public?"[32]

The aesthetic object demands a specific type of attention that
is capable of unifying individuals in a different manner from
how a theatrical or musical performance unifies an audience.
Rather than being held captive by the spatio-temporal
spectacle on stage, "the aesthetic object enables the public to
be constituted as a group because it proposes itself as an
eminent objectivity which wins individuals to itself and compels
them to forget their individual differences."[33]
This real community is fragile, however, and can immediately
be dispersed if it chooses to be. Therefore, the eminence of
the object requires a suspension of disbelief, to some degree,
advancing a possibly elitist viewpoint that the aesthetic
experience should not be associated with the real or feasible
but should be respected upon its plinth, loftier than the
banality of everyday life. Regarding the quotidian, Dufrenne
argued that it is the space and time in which an idea of a
public becomes problematic; it is an arena of conflict and
difference. Kept apart from such a realm of adversity, the
experience of the aesthetic object transports individuals
toward an arena of unanimity: "Man in front of the aesthetic
object transcends his singularity and becomes open to the
universally human."[34] The feasibility of an art of everyday
life, in terms of one that might be socially transformative, is
unlikely, since the collectivity inspired by the aesthetic object
is an experience isolated from all others; in this Dufrenne was
decisively modernist. In other words, what the presence of
the art work accomplishes cannot be accomplished without it,
for "[i]t is the identity of the object which assures the identity
of its representations. Thus it is not a question of a collective
consciousness but of a consciousness directed by a common
[i.e. shared] object."[35]
In the chapter entitled "The Truth of the Aesthetic Object,"
Dufrenne considered the anomaly of the art work in relation to
other objects in greater detail. For the viewer, the art work
presents an opportunity for slowing down or dissolving the
world outside its presence.
At first sight, there seems to be no common measure
between the world of the aesthetic object and the real
world – that is, if one identifies the "real" with
"objective". The aesthetic object reveals a world which
is subjective – indeed, less a world than an atmosphere
of a world – and which represented objects illustrate but
do not determine.[36]
Keeping in mind that, again, the objects referred to here are
most likely traditional art works, such as paintings and
sculptures, it becomes easier to understand how the world-asillustrated could be considered separate from the world-aslived. The moment of contemplation as the autonomy of art
and the suspension of real time is supported by the idea that
the art work is a world unto itself. For Dufrenne, the
"objective world" of everyday life is unstable in comparison
with the moment of aesthetic experience because it is made
up of countless and indeterminate variables that one must
navigate using what can only be called common knowledge or
rationality. And yet
it is not with the objective world as conceived by science
one should compare the aesthetic object. Instead, the

aesthetic object should be compared with the real,
which we must intercept at the point where it does not
yet have a determinate signification and can accept the
signification which the aesthetic object confers on
it.[37]
Here, the important suggestion is that what we might think of
as the everyday, though it exists as a figurative temporality,
cannot be articulated or conceived without first having been
represented in some way by the aesthetic object. Even
though an art work derives from the stuff of life, so does the
stuff of life proceed from what is represented by the art work.
"The objective world is the result of a projection onto the
real."[38] Aesthetic objects are therefore necessary, acting as
soothsayers to those whose perceptions are occluded by the
weight of reality.
For the real does need to be illuminated, and this can
occur through the agency of art as well as through
science. The real is the pre-objective. It is manifested
in the bruteness of fact, the constraining character of
being-there, the opacity of the in-itself....There is truth
only through the discovery of a meaning which
illuminates and transfigures the real and through the
ability of a subjectivity to seize this meaning.[39]
It is the concept of transfiguring the real that is important. If
the "everyday" or objective world is a broad generalization, a
way of qualifying and quantifying the indeterminable, then it
serves only to alleviate or make sense of the real, which one
experiences under hardship or duress. Dufrenne's arguments
support a model that empowers the art work with the ability to
redirect the viewer's attention away from the personal and
towards the social. Yet this model is one of autonomy,
indicating that the space of aesthetic experience must be
separate from that of "real" experience. This position is
significant since it establishes an oppositional view to the
historical avant-garde's attempts at proclaiming the exact
equality of art with everyday life, and also a problematic
platform from which the neo-avant-garde could begin to
experiment, within the context of the predominating idea of
the art institution as an ivory tower. Lyon's recent biennial that
was mentioned above showed that these experiments continue
to this day. Hence, Dufrenne's distinction between the real and
the objective might be thought of as a forerunner of more
contemporary concerns, for example, the relational or
participatory, because it begins to question the utility of art
within modernity. It is as if his phenomenology sought to
invite the next phase.
7. Conclusion
Returning to the problem of the (im)possibility of these
subjective experiences before art works that are then carried
back into the "public" or "city of spirits" and therefore into
everyday life, it is necessary to underline that Dufrenne
grappled with this issue and maintained that even if viewers
experience a moment of humane clarity before the work of art,
it cannot ever be truly transposed onto the external world.[40]
Instead, he seems to favor a model of art for art's sake,
which raises the question of whether or not in contemporary
circumstances the model of an art that acts as a conduit

between art and life can actually be taken seriously. Dufrenne
closed his exploration of the work of art and its public by
expressing great doubt that an art for the masses will ever be
achievable, since the prerequisite common bond or faith that
would allow it has not been found. Like Baudrillard many
years later, he blamed commercialized visual culture. Yet, is it
not that very consumerism that so entranced the artists of the
mid-twentieth century and has since resurfaced again and
again through the appropriation of ready made commodities?
The faith then common in the prospect of progress being
equivalent to the accumulation of wealth is now recognized as
a social handicap, one that is located in the drive to acquire
material goods in the name of one-upmanship, and the
inability to recognize that we take our different status symbols
for granted as modern luxuries.
The challenge for all contemporary art has been to evade the
regulations imposed upon the experience of art that cause it to
be included within the normative framework of the lifeworld in
the same way as shopping for groceries or attending a
lecture. While it has become important to acknowledge all of
these localities as equally worthy spaces of communication and
participation, it is the crisis of art that it should be excused
from yet still inform the mundane. As Habermas explained,
"[t]he lifeworld is, so to speak, the transcendental site where
speaker and hearer meet, where they can reciprocally raise
claims that their utterances fit the world (objective, social, or
subjective), and where they can criticize and confirm those
validity claims, settle their disagreements, and arrive at
agreements."[41] Adjusting his reasoning slightly, I would
argue that it is the tendency of some art forms, specifically
within contemporary visual culture, to demarcate these
experimental sites by borrowing from the everyday, so that
once such sites have been exited, the once normative and
banal begin to take on an unexpected luster. Dis-agreement,
or the experience of difference brought about by the
commonality of the utilitarian, will then be able to prove that
the political and the aesthetic can function at the same time.  
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